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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1956
bank deposits, recognized in Washington by statute.' This tenancy
has been extended broadly by the court to the end that the survivor
is not required to have knowledge of the tenancy prior to the depos-
itor's death.' The tentative trust differs in effect in that the beneficiary
cannot withdraw funds until the depositor's death.
Implied in the Madsen decision are several correlative results. The
majority rule is that a deposit of funds in a savings account labeled
a trust for a designated person creates only a revocable trust in the
absence of further evidence." The language used by the court implied
that they regarded the deposit as a trust as of the time of deposit
subject to a right of revocation rather than as an exception to the
statute of wills. Where the beneficiary predeceases the depositor the
trust is usually held to be automatically revoked and the successors
to the beneficiary take nothing upon the depositor's death."
The tentative trust is simple and reliable to use. The depositor's
intent is a controlling factor, and the Washington lawyer making use
of this tool would be well advised to follow the pattern of the instant
case and have the settlor make a clear statement of intent upon the
signature card, though that procedure is not necessary under the
Totten doctrine. No better evidence of his intent could be secured.
For clients with a small amount of cash to dispose of upon death who
wish to retain it for security purposes and to avoid probate of the




Substitution of a Personal Representative of Deceased Claimant.
In Curry v. Department of Labor and Industries' the Washington
Court refused to permit a deceased claimant's widow to be substituted
in her own right, and as administratrix, in an action in which neither
a verdict nor a judgment was returned in favor of the claimant prior
to his death. It is questionable whether the entering of a verdict or
a judgment should determine the survivorship of an action under the
Workman's Compensation Act.
8 RCW 33.20.030.
9 In re Green's Estate, 46 Wn.2d 637, 283 P2d 989 (1955).
10lt re Totten, note 4, supra; 1 RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 58 (1935).
"1 Matter of United States Trust Co., 117 App. Div. 178, 102 N.Y. Supp. 271 (1907),
aff'd 189 N.Y. 500, 81 N.E. 1177 (1907); Collopy's Estate, 33 D. & C. 169 (Pa. 1938).
1 149 Wash. Dec. 95, 198 P2d 485 (1956).
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Roland Curry had been awarded partial disability by the Depart-
ment of Labor and Industries for an injury received in extra-haz-
ardous work, but the Department had refused to make an allowance
for a heart condition allegedly resulting from the same accident.
Roland ultimately appealed to the superior court where the jury's
verdict upheld the Department's position. A motion for judgment
n.o.v. or, in the alternative, for a new trial, was filed on the date of
Roland's death. Grace Curry, the claimant's widow, was substituted
in her own right and as administratrix, and the trial court entered
judgment n.o.v. On appeal by the Department, the supreme court
reversed the judgment n.o.v. without prejudice to the right of the
widow to apply for a pension under RCW 51.32.050.2
When Curry died, neither a verdict nor a judgment had been rendered
in his favor. His claim had not ripened into an award. No property, in
connection with his claim, descended to his personal representative for
the benefit of his estate. His claim was personal to himself and abated
at his death.3
The Curry case thus indicates that the cause of action abates at the
death of the claimant unless such claimant has received an award or
a jury verdict or a judgment in his favor prior to his death.
The Workman's Compensation Act4 as construed in the leading
case of Ray v. Industrial Insurance Commission' indicates that the
cause of action abates at the death of the claimant unless a warrant
has been delivered to such claimant prior to his death.' In the Ray
2RCW 51.32.050 provides for death benefits for the widow of a deceased workman.
See also Beels v. Department of Labor and Industries, 178 Wash. 301, 34 P2d 917(1934) which held that a wife cannot be deemed, during her husband's lifetime, a party
in interest to any proceeding instituted by him to enforce any claim for workman's
compensation. Her rights, as a widow, arise the instant her husband dies.
3 149 Wash. Dec. at 98, 298 P2d at 488 (1956).
- RCW 51.32.040: The main body of the statute, aside from its provisos, is derivedfrom Wash. Laws of 1911, c.74, § 10: "No money paid or payable under this act
out of the accident fund shall, prior to issuance and delivery of the warrant therefor,
be capable of being assigned, or garnished, nor shall the same pass to any other
person by operation of the law. Any such assignment or charge shall be void."
599 Wash. 176, 168 Pac. 1121 (1917). After the holding in the Ray case, the Legis-
lature of 1923 by amendment, expressly provided for substitution of a widow or a
child or children of the deceased in specific instances, none of which is relevant here.
See Wash. Sess Laws 1923, C.136, § 4 p. 399 ([Cf.] Rein. Rev. Stat. 7684); RCW
51.32.040.
6 In reaching its result the court stated that "the test of survivorship of a cause of
action is its assignability, and conversely, the test of assignability is survivorship,
which is to say assignability and survivability are convertable terms." 99 Wash. 176,178, 168 Pac. 1121, 1122 (1917). This test was first advanced in Slauson v. Schwabacher
Bros. & Co., 4 Wash. 783, 31 Pac. 329 (1892). The case is frequently cited as authority
in Washington but its holding is anomalous when examined in the light of the lan-guage of RCW 4.20.040 and its interpretation: "All ... causes of action.., by one
person against another, whether arising on contract or otherwise, survive to the per-
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case, the deceased received an injury which, under the schedule of
allowances as fixed by the Department, entitled him to an award of
$850. He properly filed his claim for compensation with the com-
mission but before a warrant in payment thereof had been delivered
to him, he was accidentally killed. The plaintiff, as administrator,
demanded payment and received a judgment in his favor. The judg-
ment was reversed on appeal.
As all compensation for injuries received in such extra hazardous
employment and all causes of action therefor are abolished, except as
the act provided, it necessarily follows that, unless the statute confers
the right upon the plaintiff, the cause of action does not exist; more-
over, the granting power may likewise limit, control or take away the
rights conferred. 7
After setting out the express language of the statute the court con-
tinued:
The expression 'operation of law' is defined ... as: 'A term applied
to indicate the manner in which a party acquires rights without any
act of his own.' The right asserted by the plaintiff was so acquired;
and inasmuch as it is not conferred by the statute under considera-
tion, but, on the contrary is expressly denied thereby, the action
cannot be maintained. The language is plain and unambiguous. It
leaves no room for construction. To hold otherwise is not to interpret
the statute but to annihilate it."
In the light of the express language in the Ray opinion, one might
wonder how the Ray case and the Curry case can stand simultaneously
as valid authority in the same jurisdiction.
The "exception" as to judgments was first pronounced by the court
in Calkins v. Department of Labor and Industries.9 In that case a
judgment for the claimant was entered by the superior court while the
appeal was pending the claimant died. Substitution of the plaintiff-
administrator as a party to the action was resisted but an order was
made by the court directing the substitution. To do so, the court
construed RCW 51.32.040 as not purporting to apply to judgments
since it does not mention them. The court then looked to prior deci-
sions" which had held that a judgment is property which descends
sonal representatives of the former and against the personal representatives of the
latter." See 28 WAsH. L. REv. 201 (1951).
799 Wash. at 177, 78, 168 Pac. at 1121 (1917). See RCW 51.04.010.
8 99 Wash. at 178, 168 Pac. at 1122 (1917).
) 10 Wn2d 565, 117 P.2d 640 (1941).
10 r"ight v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 45 Wash. 432, 88 Pac. 832 (1907); Gordon
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to the representatives of the deceased for the benefit of the estate
and thereby allowed the substitution.
The result was extended to include jury verdicts in Carl v. Depart-
ment of Labor and Industries." Carl appealed to the superior court
from a decision for the Department. He received a jury verdict in his
favor but died before judgment was entered on the verdict. By look-
ing beyond the Workman's Compensation Act to other statutory pro-
visions12 and prior decisions,13 the court permitted the legal repre-
sentative of the claimant's estate to be substituted.
In the Curry case, the court refused to extend the exception further
to include instances wherein the claimant had a cause of action at
the time of his death. In so refusing, the court relied upon a conclu-
sion that Curry had only an unliquidated claim at the time of his
death. Assuming this to be true, its relevance is questionable since
the Workman's Compensation Act does not discuss liquidated or
unliquidated claims. The Act, as interpreted in the Ray case, provides
for payment to a personal representative only if there is a pre-existing
partial or total disability award made to the workman prior to his
death.
The Washington Court did not expressly answer whether or not
a judgment or a verdict is an award in the sense of the statute. It
merely drew the line. Under the present law in Washington, if the
claimant has either a verdict or a judgment in his favor prior to his
death, the court will look beyond the Workman's Compensation Act
and permit a substitution. If a verdict was returned against the
claimant or if the action is merely pending at the date of the death of
the claimant, the Workman's Compensation Act is controlling, and
the cause of action in the claimant's behalf is abated. The effect then,
is a partial rather than complete ignoring of the provisions of the
Workman's Compensation Act.
JER o E FARuis
v. Hillman. 102 Wash. 411, 173 Pac. 22 (1918). Neither case pertained to a claim
under the Wrkman's Compensation Act.
11 38 Wn.2d 890, 234 P.2d 487 (1951).
12 RCW 51.52.115: Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.) § 7697-2 (P.P.C. § 704-3) to the effect
that the jury's verdict in every such appeal shall have the same force and effect as in
actions at law.
13 Garrett v. Byerly, 155 Wa~li 351, 284 Pac. 343 (1930); Nenezich v. Elich, 183
Wash. 657, 49 P.2d 33 (1935). In actions at law, where the action would otlerwisc
abate upon death of one ot the parties, if the jury's verdict has been entered prior
to death, a judgment, the entry of which is delayed by the trial court or the oppos-




Recovery of Independent Contractors. In two recent Washington
decisions,' the Washington Supreme Court reappraised its past deci-
sions concerning the recovery of independent contractors under the
Workmen's Compensation Act.' The court redefined those elements
necessary in the contract to enable the independent contractor to
recover under the Act.'
In White v. Department of Labor and Industries,4 the claimant,
Lucinda White, and her husband, Wiliam White, entered into an oral
contract with the Steiner mill, in which the Whites were to use a
donkey engine, owned by themselves, to yard and cold deck logs at
the mill for $12 per thousand board feet. It was understood that the
claimant was to assist. The Whites had been working as per contract
for about three weeks when the Steiner mill fired the man they had
hired to do the falling and bucking. The Steiner mill agreed to pay
the Whites $20 per thousand if they would accept the responsibility
for the falling and bucking. The Whites hired a Mr. Lydey to do this
work at the same pay the Steiner mill had paid their own man, $8 per
thousand board feet, or the exact amount of the increase given the
Whites by the Steiner mill.
Work progressed under the latter arrangement for another three
weeks when the claimant, Mrs. White, was seriously injured. Mrs.
White applied for benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
This claim was rejected on the grounds that, as an independent con-
tractor, she was not covered. Upon appeal to the superior court, it
was determined that, "... at the time of her injury [Mrs. White] was
an independent contractor doing extra hazardous work in the logging
industry and the essence of her contract was her personal labor;"'
and judgment was entered for Mrs. White on that conclusion.
The Department of Labor and Industries appealed from that finding
and the supreme court reversed, holding that the essence of the con-
tract between the Whites and the Steiner mill was not their "personal
labor" as required by RCW 51.08.180.6 The court stated that the con-
' White v. Department of Labor and Industries, 48 Wn.2d 470, 294 P2d 650 (1956) ;
Dieckman v. Department of Labor and Industries, 149 Wash. Dec. 367, 301 P.2d 763(1956).
2 Chapter 51 RCW.
8 RCW 51.08.180.
448 Wn2d 470, 294 P.2d 650 (1956).
5 48 Wn.2d at 476, 294 P.2d at 654.6 RCW 51.08.180 states, "The term workman within the contemplation of this act
means every person in this state who is engaged in the employment of or who is work-
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tract of an independent contractor must be one "... . the essence of
which is his personal labor,"' in order for him to recover under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. This was further defined so as to
exclude an independent contractor,
(a) who must of necessity own or supply machinery or equipment (as
distinguished from the usual hand tools) to perform the contract, or
(b) who obviously could not perform the contract without assistance,
or (c) who of necessity or choice employs others to do all or part of
the work he has contracted to perform. s
The court held that (1) under their original contract the Whites had
to furnish heavy machinery (the donkey engine), (2) under their
modified contract the Whites could not personally perform all of the
contract, and (3) under their modified contract the Whites did hire
another to do part of the work contracted for.
Judge Finley, with Judges Ott and Rosellini concurring, wrote a
dissenting opinion in which he stated that the majority was construing
the statute9 too narrowly, and that the personal labor of the Whites
was the essence of their contract. Judge Finley said that the hiring
of Lydey should not change the essence of the contract for it was
merely an accommodation to the Steiner mill with the Whites acting
as an agent. Further, the dissenting opinion stated that it was difficult
to see how the use of mechanical equipment could change the status
of an independent contractor when the use of identical equipment by
an employee or workman would not change his status under the act.
Judge Finley said, "The question determining the matter of coverage
under the act is not whether the work in fact could be done by another
workman, but whether work done by someone other than the contract-
ing party or worker would have constituted performance of the particu-
lar contract."'" Since both Mr. and Mrs. White were to work, Mrs.
White's personal labor was the essence of the contract.
In Dieckman v. Department of Labor and Industries," the depart-
ment rejected the claimant's application for a widow's pension after
her husband was killed in a logging accident. The deceased and his
brother had contracted to move some logs with a cherrypicker owned
by the latter. The claimant appealed to the superior court which dis-
ing under an independent contract, the essence of which is his personal labor for any
employer coming under this act whether by way of manual labor or otherwise in the
course of his employment." (emphasis added)
7RCW 51.08.180.
8 48 Wn.2d at 474, 294 P.2d at 653.
9 RCW 51.08.180.
10 48 Wn.2d at 482, 294 P.2d at 657.
1-149 Wash. Dec. 367, 301 P.2d 763 (1956).
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missed the appeal with prejudice. From that judgment the claimant
appealed to the supreme court which stated that the White case was
controlling in this instance. Although an employer may contract with
two men, the essence of which is their joint personal labor, their
personal labor is not of the essence of the contract where they, of
necessity, must supply machinery other than hand tools.
Judge Finley, with Judge Rosellini concurring, again dissented,
saying that where an individual performs acts for an employer coming
under the act, which are similar to the labors of ordinary employees
covered by the act, he should be entitled to industrial insurance
benefits even though the work is done under an independent contract
and not as an ordinary employee. The fact that other equipment was
used, should not preclude an independent contractor from benefits
under the Workmen's Compensation Act if the essence of the em-
ployment contract was his personal labor, manual or otherwise.
The court supported the result reached in the White case largely
on the strength of three earlier decisions: Haller v. Department of
Labor and Industries,2 Crall v. Department of Labor and Industries,"
and Cook v. Department of Labor and Industries.4 In the Haller
case, there was a contract to clean a well. The court found that the
contract could not have been performed without assistance, that this
must have been within the knowledge of the contracting parties, and
that, therefore, the personal labor of the independent contractor was
not the essence of the contract. In the Crall case, there was a contract
to haul logs. Although heavy equipment was to be used in the per-
formance of the contract, Crall was known by the employer to have
several trucks and other drivers. Nothing in the contract said that
Crall alone was to do the hauling, and, therefore, the court concluded,
it was completed by the parties that others might satisfactorily perform
the contract and Crall's personal labor was not of the essence. In the
Cook case, heavy equipment was also used, but the court found that the
claimant's wife assisted him in loading the truck, a job which was im-
practicable for one person to attempt. Since the contracting parties
must have known the work could not be carried out without assistance,
the personal labor of the claimant could not have been the essence of
the contract.
In two of the three forementioned cases, there was heavy equip-
22 13 Wn2d 164, 124 P2d 559 (1942).
23 45 Wn.2d 497, 275 P.2d 903 (1954).
14 46 Wn2d 475, 282 P.2d 265 (1955).
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ment involved."5 More important might be the fact that in each of
the three cases, it was specifically found that either the work con-
tracted for could not be performed by the contracting party alone,"0 or
it was intended that the work need not be performed by the individual
contracting." It is possible to conclude from this analysis that in the
Haller, Crall, and Cook cases the essence of the contract could not
have been the personal labor of the independent contractor, regardless
of the presence or absence of any equipment.
In the White case, heavy equipment owned by the independent
contractor was to be used in performance of the contract. But further,
the original contract called specifically for the labor of both Mr. and
Mrs. White, whose personal labors were known to be sufficient to carry
out the contract. If the hiring of the bucker and faller is viewed as an
accommodation for the Steiner mill,8 it would appear that the Whites
were, ". . . working under an independent contract, the essence of
which is (their) personal labor ... by way of manual labor or other-
wise . . . " (emphasis added)"0
In the Dieckman case, heavy equipment, owned by one of the two
independent contractors, was necessary for the completion of the
contract. The court stated that an employer could contract for the
personal labor of two parties, which was the situation here. Therefore,
the only reason for holding that the personal labor of the Dieckman
brothers was not the essence of the contract was the presence and use
of a cherrypicker owned by them.
It appears from the decisions in the White and Dieckman cases,
that where an independent contractor must, of necessity or by the
terms of the contract, provide any tools or equipment for the comple-
tion of the contract, the essence of that contract is to be determined
primarily by the size and nature of the tools needed to complete
performance. Thus, a carpenter, working as an independent con-
tractor, would probably come within the Act if he used only a hammer
and saw, because they are hand tools. 2 But what is his status when,
of choice or necessity, he uses a power skillsaw, a portable power
25 Crall v. Department of Labor and Industries, 45 Wn.2d 497, 275 P.2d 903 (1954).
Cook v. Department of Labor and Industries, 46 Wn2d 475, 282 P2d 265 (1955).16 Hailer v. Department of Labor and Industries, 13 Wn.2d 164, 124 P.2d 559
(1942) ; Cook v. Department of Labor and Industries, 46 Wn.2d 475, 282 P2d 265(1955).
3. Crall v. Department of Labor and Industries, 45 Wn.2d 497, 275 P.2d 903 (1954).
Is See dissent of Judge Finley 48 Wn2d 470, 294 P2d 650 (1956).
19 RCW 51.08.180.




planer, a portable table saw, or larger lumber working tools? It is
difficult to see how the use of mechanical equipment can change the
status of an independent contractor when use of the identical equip-
ment by an employee or workman would not change his status under
the Workmen's Compensation Act."
Although the principles set forth in the two cases under discussion
will probably provide the basis on which similar cases are to be de-
cided, it would seem, if the intent of the legislature was to broaden
the act,)2 2 that a better formula for deciding whether or not the personal
labor of an independent contractor is the essence of the contract, was
set down in the White case by Judge Finley in his dissenting
opinion, wherein he said, "The test should be whether the work or job
performed by someone other than the claimant would constitute per-
formance of the particular contract.""
DAviD J. WHITmoRE
Aggravation of Previously Impaired Condition-Cancer. In Harbor Plywood
Corporation v. Department of Labor and Industries, 48 Wn2d 553, 295 P2d 310
(1956), Ash had received an industrial injury for which compensation had been awarded
by the department. The injury reactivated a malignant cancer condition which caused
Ash's death. Grace Ash, widow of the deceased workman, filed for a widow's pension
and received an award, from which the employer, Harbor Plywood Corporation, ap-
pealed to the superior court which affirmed the award. The employer then appealed to
the supreme court on the grounds that the finding of the trial court that the deceased's
death was accelerated by the aggravation of a malignant cancerous condition, was a
conclusion of law and not a finding of fact.
In affirming the award the court said that, although the cause of cancer is unknown,
medical science has learned enough about it to substantiate medical testimony regarding
its symptoms and effects. Competent medical testimony showing death to be accelerated
by aggravation of a cancer condition will sustain an award so based regardless of the
fact that death would ultimately have resulted from the condition without the aggrava-
tion by injury. If an injury, as defined in the act, reactivates a latent condition caused
by disease, the resulting disability is attributed to the injury and not to the pre-existing
condition.
Workmen's Compensation-Election of Remedies-Right to Remedy Against
Third Party Tort-Feasor. In Hand v. Greyhound Corporation, 149 Wash. Dec. 167,
299 P.2d 554 (1956), the plaintiff, Hand, sought to recover for personal injuries sus-
tained in a collision with the defendant's bus operated by one of the defendant's
employees. At the time of the accident both Hand and the bus driver, and also their
employers, came within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as being
-I See dissent of Judge Finley 149 Wash. Dec. 367, 301 P.2d 763 (1956).
22 Norman v. Department of Labor and Industries, 10 Wn.2d 180, 116 P2d 360
(1941). Although this case held that ,"... it was the intention of the legislature to
broaden the industrial insurance act," the later decisions have tended to restrict the
operation of the section under discussion.
' 48 Wn.2d at 482, 294 P.2d at 657.
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engaged in extrahazardous employment. The trial court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment relying on RCW 51.24.010. This statute gives the
injured workman an election either to take under the act or to pursue his remedy
against another not in the same employ to whose negligence or wrong the injury is
attributed. However, it is further provided that no action may be brought against any
employer or workman who at the time of the accident was covered by the act.
On appeal the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the applicable provision,
in that it placed him in an arbitrary and unreasonable classification and deprived him
of his common-law cause of action. The majority of the court said that under the
act, the constitutionality of which has been repeatedly upheld, employees in extrahaz-
ardous employment are barred from pursuing their common-law tort actions for
injuries received. There is one exception to this bar. Where there is an injury
through the negligence or wrong of a third party tort-feasor not covered by the act,
the injured workman is given his election to recover under the act or seek his statu-
tory remedy against such third party. But for this sole exception, employees injured
in the course of extrahazardous employment are placed in one inclusive classification.
The court concluded that this classification was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.
In a lone dissent judge Rosellini said that a workman had a right to recovery for
injuries received. The plaintiff, here, had received severe burns and disfigurement,
items for which the act provided no compensation. Since the classification results in
a denial of a remuneration which may be due but not compensable under the act, it is
not effectuating the purpose of the act. The trial court should have been reversed.
Although the court properly construed the statute in this case, an opposite result
would have to be reached in applying a 1957 legislative enactment to the same fact
siw ution. In the Session Laws of 1957, Chapter 89, § 23, the legislature amended RCW
51.24.010 so that an injured workman may elect whether to take under the act or seek
his remedy against a third-party tort-feasor not in the same employ whether or not
he is an employee or an employer covered by the act.
[SUMMER
